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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a remarkable fact that more than 25 years after the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 came into effect, we still have no section
9 jurisprudence. It is not that there have been no decisions at all concerning
the right not to be arbitrarily detained, of course, but taken in total they
do not come anywhere near setting out an analytical framework. This
stands in contrast to most other legal rights in the Charter. Section 7
jurisprudence has established the two-step approach to take in assessing
claims under that section, including a three-step test for determining
whether a proposed rule is a principle of fundamental justice.2 For section
8 claims, very extensive case law has established that the right applies only
where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and that warrantless
searches are prima facie unreasonable, and, most importantly, R. v. Collins
has established a three-step test — (1) is the search authorized by law?
(2) is the law itself reasonable? and (3) is the search carried out in a
reasonable manner? — to assess any new situation involving a search.3
Similar observations can be made around the development of informational
and implementational rights relevant to section 10(b) or to the four-part
analysis of whether there has been a violation of the right to a trial within
a reasonable time in section 1 l(b).
In the case of section 9, on the other hand, the Supreme Court of
Canada has said little, and much of what it has said seems likely to be
wrong. Individual fact situations have been found to result (or not) in
arbitrary detentions, but no consistent framework for analyzing such claims
Professor, Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
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2
R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.I. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 2003 SCC 74
(S.C.C.).
3
[1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
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has been articulated or even consistently applied without being articulated.
It must surely be surprising that a quarter-century of case law on the
right to be free from arbitrary detention has not yet resulted in a clear
definition of either the word "arbitrary" or the word "detention". Indeed,
among the relatively few cases which have been decided, probably the
most significant results have been to recognize the existence of new
police powers: that is, the primary effect of section 9 case law has been
to limit personal rights rather than to protect them.
Several reasons might have led to this relative neglect. First, an alleged
violation of section 9 is unlikely to arise in isolation. If the detention is
an on-the-street encounter, such as a vehicle stop or questioning of a
pedestrian, then sections 8 and 10(b) are likely to be relevant. If the person
was detained, then he or she will have been entitled to the right to counsel
and might not have been afforded that. If the person has been charged
with an offence, in all likelihood he or she was searched without a warrant
as well as detained, and so a potential section 8 claim arises. In essence,
if the accused has said something then section 10(b) is the sensible Charter
right to assert, and if something was found on the accused, section 8 is
the best claim. If the person said nothing and nothing was found then it
is unlikely the person is an "accused" at all, and so the potential arbitrary
detention all by itself is unlikely to be litigated. There could in principle
be cases where only a section 9 violation is at issue, but they will be
rare. More probable is that a section 9 violation might be asserted as part
of a pattern of violations, but precisely because sections 8 and 10(b) already
have well-developed analytical frameworks, the section 9 discussion is
likely to be largely an afterthought.
In the above cases, any Charter violation would lead to a possible
section 24 remedy. Section 9 claims can also arise in contexts leading to
a possible section 52 remedy: where statutory schemes such as dangerous
offender legislation or security certificates are challenged.4 In those
contexts, however, there is also likely to be an objection based on section 7
or perhaps on section 12, cruel and unusual punishment. Again, the need
to rely on section 9 is diminished. Although it did not have to be the right
which was neglected, once analytical frameworks began to exist for other
rights but not for section 9, the tendency to leave arbitrary detention
undeveloped became self-reinforcing.
4
See, for example, R v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.); R v. Swain,
[1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.); or Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.).
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Also probably relevant to the development of this pattern is that
early case law seemed to make it extraordinarily easy to justify violations
of section 9. As the dissent point out in R. v. Ladouceur, the third of the
trilogy of vehicle stop cases, the roving random stop power which was
found to be saved in that case permitted any police officer to "stop any
vehicle at any time, in any place, without having any reason to do so"
which was "a total negation of the freedom from arbitrary detention
guaranteed by section 9 of the Charter"? If such a violation of section 9
could be saved under section 1, it is not surprising that defence counsel
might decide it was not ultimately fruitful to worry too much about
proving aprimafacie arbitrary detention.
In discussing the lack of section 9 jurisprudence I will consider three
issues: (1) whether "arbitrary" has or should be equated with "unlawful";
(2) what "arbitrary" means and; (3) what "detention" means. I shall proceed
in two stages: by considering the first 25 years of case law, and then the
start of the second 25 years — or, more simply, everything up to the
Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Clayton6 and then Clayton itself. In
essence, my intent is to show that both prior to and after Clayton, the
Court has not created a section 9 jurisprudence. Important questions were
left essentially unaddressed until this most recent decision, so that no
general analytical approach to section 9 existed. Further, although Clayton
addresses some of those questions, it does so in a way that still does not
create anything which could be called a section 9 jurisprudence, and which
in fact reflects a detrimental approach to analyzing the Charter in general.

II. THE FIRST 25 YEARS
1. Does "Unlawful" Equate to "Arbitrary"?
This is a relatively simple point, and its equivalent has been established
with regard to section 8 for about 20 years. Since R. v. Collins and R. v.
Kokesch it has been clear that an illegal search is an unreasonable search.7
Making this equation has had many benefits in terms of clarity, and has
had the effect of making "search and seizure law" and "section 8 law"
essentially the same thing. In that particular context, the rule is captured
[1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257, at 1264 (S.C.C.).
[2007] S.C.J. No. 32,2007 SCC 32 (S.C.C.).
7
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.); R. v. Kokesch [1990]
S.C.J. No. 117, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
5

6
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by the first two parts of the test set out in Collins for analyzing whether
there is a section 8 violation: whether the search is authorized by law,
and whether the law itself is reasonable.
In the context of section 9, the equivalent point would be that an
unlawful detention is an arbitrary detention. In the first 25 years, the
Court left this point unsettled: one could not say that the statement was
true, but equally one could not say it was not true. The Ontario Court of
Appeal, for example, had rejected the equation in its decision in R. v.
Duguay, holding that a police officer who arrested on grounds that fell just
short of being reasonable would have acted unlawfully but not arbitrarily.8
On appeal, however, the only issue was whether the evidence should be
excluded, and so the Supreme Court was not required to — and did not
— comment on this point. Similarly, on other occasions the Court has
deliberately left the issue aside, as in, for example, R. v. Latimer:
"[ujnlawful arrests may be inherently arbitrary ... [but] it is not necessary
to address that question."9
The potential equation of "unlawful" and "arbitrary" would actually
break down to three related rules. Two of the rules are clear: if a detention
is lawful it is not arbitrary, and if a detention is not lawful it is arbitrary.
However, the first rule should also raise a third rule, similar to the second
part of the R. v. Collins'0 test for searches: if the detention is lawful, the
law authorizing the detention is itself reasonable.
Of these three rules, the first — if a detention is lawful it is not
arbitrary — has actually been laid down by the Court. It held recently in
R. v. Mann that "[i]t is well recognized that a lawful detention is not
'arbitrary'," " and that is in accord with the result in a long line of cases.
What has not been so clearly established is whether there is a need to
ask the follow-up question, "is the law itself reasonable?" This is an
area in which the lack of a section 9 analytical framework is apparent.
The Court has failed to specifically state whether this is or is not a rule,
and its practice in this regard has made it difficult to glean a rule by
implication.
In some cases, the Court has necessarily been asking whether the
law itself is reasonable, since a statutory scheme permitting detention was

[1985] O.J. No. 2492,45 C.R. (3d) 140 (Ont. C.A.).
[1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217, at para. 2(
[1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49,2004 SCC 52, at para. 20.
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at issue. In deciding that the provisions in the Criminal Code'2 requiring
the automatic detention of anyone found not guilty by reason of insanity
violated section 9, for example, the very issue was the reasonableness of
the law.13 Further, in many of the vehicle stop cases, effectively the
equivalent of asking "is the law itself reasonable?" results from the
Court's approach in those decisions: find the detention arbitrary but
uphold the law authorizing it under section 1. This approach, adopted
for example in R. v. Hufsky, R. v. Ladouceur and R. v. Wilson, amounts
to saying that the detention was authorized by law and that the law itself
was reasonable.14 In other cases the Court has explicitly referred to the
issue as though it were a necessary step: in R. v. Latimer, for example,
the Court concluded that the arrest was lawful and therefore "failing an
attack against the legislative provision which authorized the arrest",
there could not be a section 9 violation.15 It is therefore apparent that the
question must sometimes be asked.
On the other hand, in other cases the Court's treatment of the question
is less clear. In R. v. Jacques}6 for example, the Court concluded that the
Customs Act" permitted a customs officer to stop and search a vehicle
on the relatively low standard that the officer suspects the possibility of
smuggling. The majority and dissent disagreed over whether the evidence
permitted that suspicion reasonably to be formed, the majority concluding
that it did. The majority also explains why the border crossing context
meant that this lower standard was "eminently understandable".18 However,
it is not entirely clear in context whether this discussion is meant to be a
rejection of a section 9 challenge to the legislative provision, an argument
that the section 9 violation is justified under section 1, an interpretive tool to
understanding the wording of the Customs Act, or something else.
Further, some cases seem to ignore the question. In R. v. Mann, for
example, the Court creates a common law power of investigative detention
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 542 (2).
R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.).
14
R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ladouceur,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.); R. v. Wilson, [1990] S.C.J. No. 54, [1990]
1 S.C.R. 1291 (S.C.C.).
15
[1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217, at para. 26 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Dedman,
[1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.), where the Court concluded that a vehicle stop was
not authorized by s. 14 of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 202, and therefore that
"it is unnecessary to express an opinion as to the constitutional validity of s. 14" (at para. 63).
16
[1996] S.C.J. No. 88, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312 (S.C.C.).
17
R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.).
18
R. v. Jacques, [1996] S.C.J. No. 88, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312, at para. 15 (S.C.C.).
12
13
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and accordingly concludes that the accused was not unlawfully detained:
it moves from that immediately to the conclusion that he was not arbitrarily
detained.19 To do so is to ignore any requirement that the law itself must
be reasonable. Of course one might suggest that in Mann, or any other
case involving the use of the ancillary powers doctrine, the step is
unnecessary because the court would not create a common law power
and then find it to be unreasonable. In fact, though, the Court does not
omit this step when engaged in this same process in other contexts.
In R. v. Mann,20 for example, the Court used the ancillary powers
doctrine first to create the investigative detention power and second to
create a power of search incident to that investigative detention. In the
search context the Court observed:
A finding that a limited power of protective search exists at common
law does not obviate the need to apply the Collins test for determining
whether a warrantless search passes constitutional muster under section 8
of the Charter.2^

That is, even though the Court had just created a new common law
power, it still noted the separate requirement that that law was required
to be reasonable.
Certainly a specific requirement that any law authorizing a detention
must itself be reasonable seems like a minimum requirement for a sensible
section 9 analytical framework. The Court has tended to operate on the
assumption that there is such a rule, but it would be beneficial to have
that requirement unambiguously stated.
The more difficult half of equating "unlawful" with "arbitrary" is the
final issue: whether, if a detention is not lawful, that automatically means
it is arbitrary. This equation has been made in the case of searches, but
was not, in the first 25 years, settled in the case of detentions.
As noted above, the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Duguay22 rejected
this position, on the basis that an arrest which fell just short of reasonable
grounds should not be seen as arbitrary. That particular argument has
probably been overtaken by subsequent events. When the Ontario Court
of Appeal took that position, one could have said with some confidence
that short of the existence of reasonable and probable grounds, the police
19
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.). The same approach is taken in R. v. Dedman,
[1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.).
20
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.).

21

[2004] S.C.J. No. 49,2004 SCC 52, at para. 44 (S.C.C.). See also para. 36.

22

[1985] O.J. No. 2492, 45 C.R. (3d) 140 (Ont. C.A.).
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had no authority to detain an individual. Since R. v. Mann,23 of course, it
is clear that this position is no longer correct: police can also briefly
detain an individual where they have reasonable grounds to suspect that
there is a clear nexus between that individual and a recent or ongoing
criminal offence, and the detention is reasonable in all the circumstances.
As a result, it is no longer clear that a detention on something "just short"
of reasonable grounds would be unlawful at all: it might well qualify as an
investigative detention and thus still be lawful.24
However, the issue of unlawful detentions is broader than failed arrests:
there are many circumstances in which the state could fail to comply
with the requirements of the law and as a result detain an accused. For
example, section 503 of the Criminal Code25 requires an arrested person
to be taken before a justice of the peace as soon as practicable, and in
any case within 24 hours: failure to comply with that requirement will
result in an unlawful detention. Lower courts are divided as to whether
such a detention will be arbitrary. This particular issue has actually
come before the Supreme Court of Canada, but its entire decision —
overturning a court of appeal judgment — consisted of two sentences
stating that there was no reason to interfere with the exercise of discretion
by the trial judge.26 On no other occasion in the first 25 years did the Court
clarify this issue, and so whether unlawfulness necessarily amounted to
arbitrariness was left in doubt.
There are good reasons to adopt such a rule: simplicity and clarity
are among them. If arbitrariness can be inferred from unlawfulness, that
does not end the analysis: further steps follow which allow for balancing
the competing interests. On the other hand, if unlawfulness need not
mean arbitrariness, then before reaching those other steps additional
analytical tools will need to be developed. If it is not just unlawfulness
that makes a detention arbitrary, then what further criteria must be met
as well? Since these considerations, whatever they might be, can be built
[2004] S.CJ. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.).
See, for example, R. v. Pimentel, [2000] MJ. No. 256, 2000 MBCA 35 (Man. C.A.),
where the Manitoba Court of Appeal found that an officer who had arrested an accused did not
have grounds to do so, but did have articulable cause and therefore had the authority on that basis to
detain the person. Pimentel predates R. v. Mann, [2004] S.CJ. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.) and so
does not apply the investigative detention test arising from it. Although this means a different result
might be reached on the particular facts, it does illustrate that such an approach is possible.
25
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
26
See R. v. Simpson, [1994] N.J. No. 69,29 C.R. (4th) 274, at para. 98 (Nfld. C.A.), revd [1995]
S.C.J. No. 12, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 449 (S.C.C.). See also ft. v. W. (E.), [2002] N.J. No. 226, 168 C.C.C.
(3d) 38 (Nfld. C.A.), or R. v. Tarn, [1995] B.C.J. No. 1428, 100 C.C.C. (3d) 196 (B.C.C.A.).
23
24
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into other aspects of the analysis, it is unnecessarily complex to introduce
an extra step at this preliminary stage.
More important than clarity and simplicity, however, would be the
fact that equating unlawfulness with arbitrariness would better reflect the
way that the state's coercive powers are meant to interact with individual
liberty. The point has been stated by the Court many times, but was put
most succinctly in ft v. Mann:
Absent a law to the contrary, individuals are free to do as they please.
By contrast, the police (and more broadly, the state) may act only to
the extent that they are empowered to do so by law.27

That is, individuals should be free from coercive intervention unless
some specific power authorizes the police or other state actors to so
intervene. This is a fundamental proposition not just about criminal
investigative powers, but about the nature of liberal democracy. Equating
unlawfulness with arbitrariness accords with this position: failing to make
the equation is inconsistent with it.
If the unlawfulness of a detention — that is, the fact that the police
were not empowered by law to make the detention — meant that it was
arbitrary, then an individual might be able to obtain a Charter remedy.
This result would not be guaranteed, since there will be further hurdles
to cross, but this approach would provide some positive support for the
assertion that individuals are free to do as they please. On the other hand,
if unlawfulness did not amount to arbitrariness, then in some cases there
would be no violation of section 9 despite the fact that the police had
acted without authority. This would amount to saying that individuals
are not always free to do as they please even though there is no law to
the contrary. It would also amount to saying that police may sometimes
act even though they are not empowered to do so by law. hi other words,
denying the equation contradicts both components of this fundamental
democratic proposition.
It is also worth elaborating on the further steps involved in the Charter
analysis: at least three "safety valves" exist to help guard against anything
seeming like an unmeritorious claim, hi particular, for an accused to receive
any real benefit from a section 9 Charter argument, the police action
must not only have been arbitrary but also must have amounted to a
detention, that arbitrary detention must not be saved under section 1,
and a remedy (most likely under section 24) must be appropriate. At each
27

[2004] S.CJ. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52, at para. 15 (S.C.C.).
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of these stages the claim could fail, and so equating "unlawful" with
"arbitrary" is not the end of the story.
That said, it must be acknowledged that there are some limits on
how effective those safety valves could actually be. Realistically, it is
likely that in many cases where a section 9 claim is pursued, the
"detention" aspect of the analysis will be met. At least in cases where
police have purported to use a power but have fallen outside the conditions
for using it — the type of "failed arrest" cases falling just short of
reasonable grounds referred to in R. v. Duguay2* or overly long periods
before an arrested person is taken before a justice of the peace in
accordance with section 503 of the Criminal Code29 — the nature of the
interference with liberty is likely to meet any reasonable definition of
"detention". The point of such police powers, after all, is precisely to
authorize police to assert control over an individual's liberty. If police
have attempted to use such a power without meeting the conditions for
doing so, there is not likely to be much doubt that the individual was
detained.
On the other hand, if the unlawfulness arises from the fact that police
are simply acting in a way which is unregulated — by asking questions
of an individual on the street without asserting control over that person's
movements, for example — then there could be some dispute over whether
there was a detention at all. When the unlawfulness arises from a complete
absence of any power rather than a failed exercise of a power, what is most
likely to be at issue is a psychological detention, which will be discussed in
greater detail below. For the moment it is only necessary to observe that
psychological detentions are the most difficult to identify, and so in this
context at least the need to meet this further criterion could plausibly
lead to a finding that there is no prima facie section 9 violation.
It should also be noted that adopting the relatively broad approach
of saying that unlawfulness equates to unreasonableness could cause
more narrow approaches to be used elsewhere, such as in defining
"detention". In the search context, for example, the Court has not only
said that an illegal search is an unreasonable one, it has also held that a
warrantless search is prima facie unreasonable. As a practical matter,
though, warrantless searches not authorized by any law do sometimes
produce evidence of crime, and it is only those instances that actually
come to court. As a result, judges tend only to see the factually guilty,
28
29

[1985] O.J. No. 2492, 45 C.R. (3d) 140 (Ont. C.A.).
R.S.C. 1985,c. C-46.
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but are faced with rules saying that the warrantless action was illegal and
therefore unreasonable. In response, there has been a tendency in recent
years to reconsider and narrow the meaning of the word "search", and to
restrict the impact of section 8 in that fashion.30 It would be unfortunate
if the effect of making clearer the meaning of "arbitrarily" in section 9
were simultaneously to make less clear the meaning of "detained".
The second safety valve, the use of section 1, is also likely to have a
limited role in practice. If there is aprimafacie section 9 violation, then
in principle that infringement of rights could be justified under section 1.
However, a requirement of saving a violation under section 1 is that it
was "prescribed by law": by definition we would be discussing violations
not prescribed by law, since the arbitrariness arises from unlawfulness.
Admittedly the Court has been responsible for some fancy manoeuvring
around the "prescribed by law" issue, such as by finding a law in the
"operational requirements" of a statute in R. v. Orbanski.^ Still, to do
anything of that sort in this context would be to find that the infringement
was not unlawful after all, so it would remove it from the set of cases
under discussion.
On the other hand, section 24 can function perfectly well as a safety
valve. Courts routinely find violations of section 8 or section 10(b) but
decide that the evidence garnered should nonetheless be admitted. Under
section 24(1), only an "appropriate and just" remedy is to be granted. If
the unlawfulness in question is so minor as to amount to a technicality,
then despite the finding of a section 9 violation it could be that granting
no remedy is just in the circumstances.
Of course, the remedy section must truly be used as a safety valve:
that is, with regard to the particular circumstances of a particular case. It
ought not to be used on a "blanket" basis to ignore particular classes of
section 9 violations. If courts were to reason, for example, that no remedy
was appropriate on any occasion when police detained a person only briefly
for an investigative detention without meeting the R. v. Mann32 criteria,
this would actually amount to creating a new police power. Since there
would be no consequence to the finding of a section 9 violation, and indeed
there would be tacit approval of the behaviour, courts would effectively
30
See R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 (S.C.C.) or R. v. Tessling,
[2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.). The Court's pending review of
R. v. Brown, [2006] A.J. No. 755, 2006 ABCA 199 (Alta. C.A.) should cast more light, for good or ill,
on this development.
31
R.V. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 2005 SCC 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
32
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.).
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be giving a green light to police to act as though they had such a power.
That is not the role of section 24.
This point does raise, however, an important fourth safety valve
which makes it appropriate to equate "unlawful" with "arbitrary". It is
not the task of section 9, nor of courts in interpreting section 9, to see to
it that all necessary police powers exist. Of course society is safer when
genuinely necessary police powers exist, but nonetheless creating those
powers is not the role of section 9 of the Charter.
Rather, the role of section 9, like that of the rest of the Charter, is to
protect against state power, and police power in particular. If police act
where they have no power to do so, the Charter should protect individuals
by recognizing that police did not have the authority to act, which is what
equating "unlawful" and "arbitrary" would do. If more police powers
should exist, then it is open to Parliament to change the Criminal Code" or
some other statute. That is precisely the purpose of the "prescribed by law"
criterion in section 1: to recognize that Charter rights can be overridden
for a sufficiently important competing objective, but only when legislators
have determined to do so. Exactly the same reasoning applies in this
context. If particular unlawful police action seems like it should not be
found to violate section 9, then Parliament could authorize it. At that stage
the quite fully developed analytical framework already built up around
section 1 can be used to assess the competing interests.
Failing to equate "unlawful" and "arbitrary", however, makes it more
difficult to follow this route. As a result, failing to make this equation is
not just an instance of the lack of section 9 jurisprudence in itself: it also
helps prevent using well-developed jurisprudence developed in other areas
of the Charter.
I suggest, therefore, that it would be entirely beneficial for section 9
jurisprudence to include the rule that an unlawful detention is an arbitrary
one. That is, however, the start of the analysis, not the end of it. To say
that unlawful detentions are arbitrary is a useful part of the definition of
"arbitrary", but it is not the entire definition. We should therefore now
turn to look at that question in greater detail.
2. The Definition of "Arbitrary"
This is an aspect of section 9 where the Court has actually articulated
a rule. Unfortunately it seems pretty clear that the rule laid down cannot
33

R.S.C. 1985, c. CM6.
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be correct and that something more, or perhaps something entirely different,
is needed.
The earliest cases dealing with section 9 were a series of vehicle stop
cases. In R. v. Hufsky,Mthe particular scheme in question was authorized
by statute and allowed police to randomly stop vehicles to check for
mechanical fitness and licensing issues. The stops were purely random,
not requiring any criteria to be met: rather, the selection of vehicles was
in the absolute discretion of the police officer. In this context the Court
offered its definition of "arbitrary" for the purposes of section 9: "A
discretion is arbitrary if there are no criteria, express or implied, which
govern its exercise."35
This definition was consistently applied in a number of other vehicle
stop cases.36 Importantly, it was also applied beyond vehicle stops to other
contexts: to assess various aspects of the Criminal Code's37 bail provisions,
for example.38 Similarly, in considering the automatic detention of a person
found not guilty by reason of insanity, without making specific reference
to R. v. Hufsky,39 the Court nonetheless adopted the same standard:
"[t]he duty of the trial judge to detain is unqualified by any standards
whatsoever. I cannot imagine a detention being ordered on a more
arbitrary basis."40
In the context of vehicle stops, it might have been the case that "no
criteria" was not meant to be a definition of "arbitrary", but simply one
fashion in which arbitrariness could be established. That is, it might
have been the case that one could show a detention to be arbitrary by
showing it to be governed by no criteria, but also in some other fashion
as well. However, the way in which the test was used in other cases shows
that "no criteria" is not merely a way to be arbitrary, it is the way to be
arbitrary: that is, for the Supreme Court it is the definition of the term.
In R. v. Lyons,41 for example, the dangerous offender provisions were
challenged under sections 7, 9 and 12 of the Charter. The Court noted
[1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.).
[1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621, at 633 (S.C.C.).
36
R. v. Wilson, [1990] S.C.J. No. 54, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1291 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ladouceur,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.); R. v. Macooh, [1993] S.C.J. No. 28, [1993]
2 S.C.R. 802 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615 (S.C.C.).
37
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
38
See R. v. Pearson, [1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Morales,
[1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.).
39
[1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.).
40
R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, at 1012 (S.C.C.).
41
[1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.).
34
35
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that the provisions set out criteria governing when an offender could be
designated as dangerous, and noted that: "If these criteria are themselves
unconstitutional, it is because they otherwise fail adequately to safeguard
the liberty of the individual, not because they are arbitrary."42 That is,
so long as there were criteria, the detention was not arbitrary. Any
challenge to the content of the criteria, the Court held, would involve a
challenge under section 12 (or presumably section 7).
Similarly, in both R. v. Pearson43 and R. v. Morales44 the Court adopted
"no criteria" as a definition for assessing aspects of the Code's bail
provisions. After citing the R. v. Hufsky4i definition of "arbitrary", the
Court concluded that the provisions were "not arbitrary in this sense":
that is, there were criteria. Insofar as the section 9 discussion was
concerned, that settled the matter, with no discussion about the content
of those criteria. In each case, that the provisions had some criteria —
that they were not random — led directly to the conclusion that the
provisions did not violate section 9. If the provisions were not arbitrary
in "that sense", then they were not arbitrary at all. Those two cases show
that "no criteria" is not merely one way to be arbitrary, but is in fact the
definition of "arbitrary".46
The trouble is that this definition is clearly inadequate if section 9 is
to play anything like the kind of role one would expect it to play. To
take the simplest example, if section 9 is to play any significant role at
all, then one would expect it to be capable of addressing racial profiling.
Indeed, racial profiling is one of the few situations where section 9
would actually be useful in isolation. That is, a person might be stopped
based on his or her race, but then be advised of the right to counsel and
legally searched. In such circumstances there would be no section 8 or
section 10(b) claims, but the impropriety of detaining the person based
on race should give rise to a section 9 claim.
However, to stop a person based on race is not to stop that person
based on no criteria. Rather, it is to stop the person based on improper
criteria. As the Court has developed the definition of "arbitrary" so far,
the use of improper criteria is not a relevant consideration under section 9.

[1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at 347 (S.C.C.).
[1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665 (S.C.C.).
44
[1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.).
45
[1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.).
46
[1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665, at 700 (S.C.C.); [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992]
3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.).
42
43
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The definition in R. v. Hufsky*1 consciously adopted in other cases and
contexts, excludes consideration of that issue.
That said, the Court has occasionally said things which show it
recognizes that section 9 should address interests other than random
detentions. It has not offered an alternative definition of "arbitrary", but it
has made statements inconsistent with randomness being the only relevant
issue.
In R. v. Lyons, for example, the Court suggested in the midst of its
section 9 discussion of dangerous offender legislation that "if ... a
prosecutor in a particular case was motivated by improper or arbitrary
reasons in making a Part XXI application, a section 24 remedy would lie"
(emphasis added).48
Similarly, in the context of a section 9 challenge in & v. Storrey, the
Court suggested that an otherwise valid arrest could be invalidated if it
was shown that "a police officer was biased towards a person of a different
race, nationality or colour, or that there was a personal enmity between a
police officer directed towards the person arrested".49 These cases offer
no new definition of arbitrariness, but do at least recognize that broader
issues are involved.
Quite recently, the Court has used a standard other than randomness
in assessing a section 9 claim, though without noting that they were
departing from R. v. Hufskyi0 or offering any real rationale for the different
standard. In Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)''1 the
Court was faced with a section 9 challenge to the security certificate
scheme under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act52 which
permitted foreign nationals to be detained without warrant, and which
prevented review of this detention for 120 days. The Court upheld the
first of these rules but struck down the second. In upholding detention
without a warrant under a security certificate, the Court held that a
detention is not arbitrary when there are "standards that are rationally
related to the purpose of the power of detention".53 Unlike, for example,
[1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.).
[1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at 348 (S.C.C.).
49
[1990] S.C.J. No. 12, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241, at 251-52 (S.C.C.).
50
[1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.).
51
[2007] S.C.J. No. 9, 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.).
52
S.C. 2001, c. 27.
53
[2007] S.C.J. No. 9, 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, at para. 89 (S.C.C.), quoting
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (looseleaf ed.), vol. 2 (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1997),
at 46-5.
47

48
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R. v. Lyons,54 the Court did not focus on the mere existence of criteria
at all, but rather on their content: that detention was ordered because the
person posed a danger, and this was a rational foundation. This is a better
approach than in Lyons.
On the other hand, the Court struck down the 120-day period of
non-review, holding that it violated section 9. Although it is clear that
the Court did not use the "no criteria" definition to reach this conclusion,
it is not clear what other definition was used. They noted that similar
reviews of other detentions were required to occur in periods of 24 to 48
hours, and seemingly concluded directly from this difference that the
120-day detention violated section 9.
Certainly an adequate section 9 jurisprudence requires more than a
definition of arbitrary that is limited to "based on no criteria". That
standard, as noted above, fails to deal with the very serious issue of racial
profiling. Beyond that, however, it fails to deal with many other types of
situations for which section 9 seems to be designed. Applied literally it
would have absurd results, since "foolish criteria" does not meet the "no
criteria" standard. That would mean that a police officer stopping every
car which passes would be causing arbitrary detentions, but an officer who
stopped only yellow cars because he thought he had read somewhere that
alcoholics favoured that colour would not be acting arbitrarily. The second
officer would not be violating section 9, and so would not need his ability
to act on this mistaken belief justified under section 1. It is difficult to
imagine that that is the intent behind the prohibition on arbitrary detentions.
Indeed, lower courts routinely find section 9 violations in circumstances
not based on the "no criteria" definition.
First, although police sometimes misuse their powers based on
objectionable criteria like race or nationality, there is no particular reason
that the concept of arbitrary detention should be limited to only those
particular misuses. In R. v. Herter,K for example, the accused was stopped
on suspicion of impaired driving and was deliberately unresponsive to
the officer's questions. The officer conceded in cross-examination that
he placed the accused in the drunk tank out of frustration, solely because he
had been uncooperative. The accused was kept there for over seven hours,
as a punishment for his behaviour. The judge concluded — rightly, one
would think — that this amounted to a section 9 violation. On the
[1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.).
[2006] A.J. No. 1058, 40 C.R. (6th) 349 (Alta. Prov. Ct.), revd [2007] A.J. No. 1498
(Alta. Q.B.) based on the appeal judge's different view of the facts.
54
55
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Supreme Court's definition, the officer's decision was not made randomly
or without criteria, and so was not arbitrary.
Beyond that, there are many instances of courts finding section 9
violations where no issue of malice, race-based or otherwise, arises at
all. Frequently a section 9 violation is found because police have failed
to stay within the limits of their powers, though no question of random
action arises. For example, courts recently found arbitrary detentions in all
of the following situations, none of which involved randomness or malice:
R. v. Perello: The police arrested the accused for a "proceeds of crime
investigation" solely because $55,000 cash was found in his camper van.
This was found not to constitute reasonable grounds for arrest. Although
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal took the view that being unlawful
did not automatically make the arrest arbitrary, it nonetheless found that
there was a section 9 violation.56
R. v. Calderon: The police detained the occupants of a vehicle for a
purported investigative detention concerning drug trafficking based on
"indicators" such as the presence of cell phones, fast food wrappers and
maps in the car. Pointing out the "neutrality and apparent unreliability"
of these features, the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the police
had in fact been acting on a hunch, not on a power of investigative
detention, and therefore had arbitrarily detained the accused.57
R. v. Houben: The police stopped a vehicle, but were not acting under
the authority of a statutory stop check power which did exist. Rather, they
stopped the car based on what they subjectively felt was a reasonable
suspicion. Finding that objectively the suspicion was not reasonable, the
court held that the accused's section 9 right had been violated.58
R. v. D. (J.): The police stopped the accused to question him while
he was walking on the street, but there were no reasonable grounds to
suspect that he was connected to a particular crime. As a result the
investigative detention power in R. v. Manni9 was not available and the
accused was arbitrarily detained.60
R. v. K. (C.)\e police arrested the two accused and did not take
them before a justice of the peace within 24 hours. They could have done
so during ordinary business hours but had not finished interrogating the

56
57
58
59
60

R. v. Perello, [2005] S.J. No. 60, 27 C.R. (6th) 19 (Sask. C.A.)
R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 23 C.R. (6th) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Houben, [2006] S.J. No. 715, 44 C.R. (6th) 338 (Sask. C.A.).
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.).
R. v. D. (J.), [2007] O.J. No. 1365, 45 C.R. (6th) 292 (Ont. C.J.).
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accused at that time. By the time the interrogation was over justices of
the peace were not so easily available. Because the police chose not to
respect the 24-hour deadline, there was a section 9 violation.61
R v. Jutras: The accused was a Canadian citizen stopped for impaired
driving. Because he was registered as a student at a U.S. university, the
police decided not to release him but instead to hold him overnight and
take him to a bail hearing on the basis that he was a flight risk. Since there
was no reasonable ground for this belief, his detention was arbitrary.62
These examples could be multiplied many-fold. In practice, lower
courts in Canada generally do not apply the only definition of "arbitrary"
that the Supreme Court has handed down. This means that the actual test
used for arbitrary detention is something other than what the Court has
said. We clearly need a section 9 jurisprudence which includes a more
accurate and useful definition of "arbitrarily".
I do not propose here to offer precise wording for a revised definition,
but it is clear what sort of factors must be taken into account. First, I
have suggested in the previous section that detentions should be seen
as arbitrary if they are unlawful. Accordingly, "unlawful detentions are
arbitrary" should be part of the definition. However, there is more to be
said.
As the examples from recent cases show, detentions should be seen
as arbitrary in a number of situations. When police or other state officials
deliberately misuse their powers or use them for oblique motives, any
resulting detention should be seen as arbitrary. When police are motivated
by unconscious factors to use their powers against one accused where
they would not have done so against another (which would describe some
cases of racial profiling, as well as other instances), such a detention
should be arbitrary. Where police are overly casual in the use of their
powers, choosing to arrest or detain without giving sufficient consideration
to whether the preconditions for exercising a coercive power genuinely
exist, that detention should be seen as arbitrary. When police are unwise
in the use of their powers, subjectively concluding that reasonable grounds
exist when objectively that is entirely unreasonable, the detention should
be called arbitrary. All of these are approaches which offer a more complete
and realistic meaning to the word "arbitrary".
It is worth considering how these examples interact with the suggested
rule that unlawful detentions are arbitrary. On some of these examples,
61
62

R. v. K. (C.), [2005] O.J. No. 4583, 36 C.R. (6th) 153 (Ont. C.J.).
R. v. Jutras, [2007] O.J. No. 2396, 49 C.R. (6th) 320 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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one could say that the police had acted lawfully but that the detention was
arbitrary nonetheless. Consider, for example, the roving random stop power
approved in R. v. Ladouceur.6^ Although police have the power to stop
any vehicle at any time, the case acknowledges the possibility of racial
profiling and states that it would violate the Charter.64 It would be odd to
say that such a stop had become unlawful: it would have been made
entirely in accord with the legal power granted. Rather, it would be more
natural to say that despite being lawful the detention was nonetheless
unreasonable. It would constitute an arbitrary detention on that basis.
Similarly, in R. v. Storrey,65 where the Court held that bias or enmity
could render invalid an otherwise lawful arrest, it seems unnecessary to
think of the arrest as unlawful. If an officer has subjective grounds to
arrest which are objectively reasonable, then the arrest is lawful; if the
officer is also motivated by personal dislike for the arrestee without which
he or she might have exercised the discretion differently, then the arrest
seems like an arbitrary detention. The normal requirements for a legal
arrest would still be met, however, so it would not necessarily be unlawful.
Indeed, consider subsections 495(2) and (3) of the Criminal Code:66
between them they state that although there are circumstances in which
a peace officer should not arrest, an arrest will nonetheless be lawful.
It is not odd to think that such an arrest might be arbitrary, however. It
is as true for police as for anyone else that there are times when it is
unreasonable to use the powers one has. Arbitrariness should not demand
unlawfulness.
There is a further point to be noted. The Court generally has acted on,
without specifically articulating, an equivalent to the rule for searches that
"the law itself is reasonable", which is the second part of the R. v. Collins61
analysis. It would also be beneficial to incorporate an equivalent to the
third part of that analysis, that the search is carried out in a reasonable
manner. Even when using existing search powers, police are required to
use them reasonably: the same should be said for detentions. To avoid
being arbitrary when a detention is authorized by law, the law itself
must be reasonable and the power to detain must be used in a reasonable
[1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.).
[1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.). The point is actually clearer in the
dissenting judgment, though is attributed to the majority (at 1297): "... racial considerations may be
a factor too. My colleague states that in such circumstances, a Charter violation may be made out."
65
[1990] S.C.J. No. 12, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.).
66
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
67
[1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
63
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manner. Adding this requirement would capture abuse of powers for
deliberate or unconscious racial profiling, detentions motivated by enmity
or annoyance, and even potentially foolish or unwise misuse of discretion
around bail, such as in R. v. K. (C.)6S or R. v. Jutras,69 above.
So although unlawful detentions should be arbitrary, so too should
be some lawful detentions, when there is improper police action. That is
not to say, though, that impropriety should be a requirement. It is clearer
that a detention should be seen as arbitrary if, for example, police have
not bothered to think about the limits of their power and therefore have
acted outside them. However, to insist on such a criterion would complicate
the review process. In deciding whether police had reasonable grounds
for arrest, for example, it would make it necessary to do something like
adopt two standards of review: if the grounds were not objectively
reasonable, then the arrest would be unlawful, but they would need to be
somehow even further removed from reasonable to also be arbitrary.
Similar rules would need to be adopted for the wide variety of contexts
in which detentions can occur.
This approach would be needlessly complex. As discussed in the first
section, it would be simpler, clearer, and more in accordance with the
purpose of section 9 in particular and the Charter in general to incorporate
into the definition of arbitrary the simple requirement that the detention
be unlawful. Whether a police officer has acted despite the complete
absence of any statutory or common law power to do so, or has attempted
to use a particular power but not met the specific requirements for doing
so, the resulting detention can reasonably be described as arbitrary.
Whether the failure to comply with a statutory power is serious or minor
could then properly be considered under section 24.
3. The Definition of "Detention"
The Court has articulated a reasonably clear definition of the term
"detention". That is the case, however, because many of the very earliest
Charter decisions addressed the issue of what kind of police intervention
would trigger the right to counsel in section 10(b).70 The Court subsequently

[2005] O.J. No. 4853, 36 C.R. (6th) 153 (Ont. C.J.).
[2007] O.J. No. 2396, 49 C.R. (6th) 320 (Ont. S.C.J.).
70
See, for example, R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Trask, [1985] S.C.J. No. 31, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 655, at 657 (S.C.C.); R. v. Rahn, [1985] S.C.J. No. 32,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.).
b8
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decided that the word "detention" has the same meaning in ss. 9 and 10,
and so that section 10(b) jurisprudence can be carried over.71
The Court initially considered the meaning of "detention" in R. v.
Therens, where it noted that a broad definition was appropriate because of
the existence of section 1: since limitations on the right could be justified
elsewhere, there was no need to build limits into the definition.72 Shortly
afterward the Court restated its conclusions from that case in R. v. Thomsen:
1. In its use of the word "detention", s. 10 of the Charter is directed to
a restraint of liberty other than arrest in which a person may reasonably
require the assistance of counsel but might be prevented or impeded from
retaining and instructing counsel without delay but for the constitutional
guarantee.
2. In addition to the case of deprivation of liberty by physical constraint,
there is a detention within s. 10 of the Charter, when a police officer
or other agent of the state assumes control over the movement of a
person by a demand or direction which may have significant legal
consequence and which prevents or impedes access to counsel.
3. The necessary element of compulsion or coercion to constitute a
detention may arise from criminal liability for refusal to comply with a
demand or direction, or from a reasonable belief that one does not
have a choice as to whether or not to comply.
4. Section 10 of the Charter applies to a great variety of detentions of
varying duration and is not confined to those of such duration as to
make the effective use of habeas corpus possible.73

Generally speaking these definitions, recognizing as they do that there
are different ways in which a person could be detained, have proven
quite serviceable. The one aspect, however, which has proven less
straightforward and has given rise to real difficulty in practice is the
concept, first introduced in R. v. Therens,14 of "psychological detention".
This is contained in the third part of the definition from R. v. Thomsen,75
"a reasonable belief that one does not have a choice as to whether or not
R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621, at 632 (S.C.C.).
[1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 63940 (S.C.C.). Note also R. v. Mellenthin,
[1992] S.C.J. No. 100, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615, at 622 (S.C.C.), where the Court observed that the fact
that a decision to stop a person is reasonable does not affect whether it is a detention, and is only
relevant to the s, 1 analysis.
73
[1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 649 (S.C.C.).
74
[1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
75
[1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.).
71

72
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to comply". In practice this has been a difficult test to apply, and there
would be much benefit to a more complete discussion and definition.
Unfortunately, the Court has passed up several opportunities to provide
that clarification.
Psychological detention raises complications because almost by
definition it involves situations in which police have acted where they in
fact had no power to act. Most typically the issue arises in police
questioning situations. For example, the police might ask/tell a person they
see passing on the street to step over to the police cruiser for a moment
to answer a few queries: the police might perceive the interaction as
"asking", the individual as "telling". Similarly, the police might indicate
to a suspect in a criminal investigation that they would like to interview
him or her. In either case, the individual does not have to comply, but
likely does not know that. The question of whether he or she was detained
therefore arises not only for section 9 purposes, but also to determine
whether the person should have been advised of the right to counsel.
The need for a much fuller elaboration of the factors establishing
whether an individual is or is not psychologically detained was apparent
almost immediately. In 1988, the same year R. v. Thomsen76 was decided,
the Ontario Court of Appeal set out a list of considerations to be taken into
account in deciding the issue, in R. v. Moran.11 In the nearly 20 years
since then, the Supreme Court has not added anything to that discussion.
The opportunities have existed. In 1993, the Court heard an appeal
of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Hawkins,1* a case
where an accused had been questioned at the police station without being
given the right to counsel. The central issue was whether he was, either
at the start of the questioning or at some point during it, psychologically
detained. The Court of Appeal had considered various decisions of other
courts of appeal, discussed a variety of relevant factors which had been
listed in them, including the subjective feeling of the individual and the
need sometimes to protect individuals from themselves, as well as the
changing views of the police officers doing the questioning. Ultimately
they proposed the rule that:
when these suspicions become crystallized, and the investigator's
approach to the encounter is changed from a questioning of the individual

76
77
78

[1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.).
[1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.).
[1992] N.J. No. 147, 14 C.R. (4th) 286 (Nfld. C.A.).
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to an examination with an intent to charge him or her with the offence,
that a detention must be deemed to have arisen.79

On the appeal of this case, the Supreme Court's decision overturning
the Court of Appeal judgment consisted entirely of this:
We are all of the view that on the facts of this case the respondent
was not detained. It follows that there could not be any infringement
of his rights guaranteed by section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.m

A similar opportunity to clarify psychological detention arose in 2006,
as it happens also on an appeal from a Newfoundland Court of Appeal
judgment. In R. v. Chaisson,^ a police officer saw a car parked behind a
closed service station and decided to investigate it. Seeing movement in
the car that appeared to be someone throwing something to the side when
he approached, the officer told the two occupants to get out. He then
searched and found a bag of marijuana on the car floor. The trial judge
found that this amounted to an arbitrary detention, as well as violations
of sections 8 and 10(b), and excluded the evidence. On these facts, the
question of psychological detention arises: the accused was not required
to do as the officer said, but might well have thought he was. The officer's
testimony was that he requested the two to get out of the car, but did not
order them to do so. Further, the accused did not testify as to his perception
of the situation, so there was no evidence of his subjective perception.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal held that it was reasonable to conclude
that the accused felt psychologically detained. On the other hand, it also
concluded that the detention was not arbitrary since the officer was
empowered to act by the decision in R. v. Mann,K and therefore that there
was no section 9 violation.
Again the Supreme Court overturned the decision, and again without
offering any elaboration on the question of psychological detention. On
this aspect of the decision, it simply held:
We are all of the view that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding
as it did. With respect, we are satisfied that the trial judge was entitled,

79
80
81
82

R. v. Hawkins, [1992] N.J. No. 147, 14 C.R. (4th) 286, at 298 (Nfld. C.A.).
R. v. Hawkins, [1993] S.C.J. No. 50, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 157, at 157 (S.C.C.).
[2005] N.J. No. 277, 2005 NLCA 55 (N.L.C.A.).
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on the facts as he found them, to conclude that the appellant's rights
under ss. 8, 9 and 10(b) of the Charter had been violated.83

As a result, the leading case on psychological detention seems still
to be the 1988 Ontario Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Moran.M
Perhaps the Supreme Court has felt no need to add to the discussion
because Moron got it right. If that is the case, though, it would be a simple
enough matter to say so. If not, then a proper section 9 jurisprudence
requires elaborating what the correct test for psychological detention
really is.

III. THE SECOND 25 YEARS — DOES CLAYTON CHANGE THINGS?
The Court's most recent decision with regard to section 9 is R. v.
Clayton^ handed down in July 2007. One might ask whether Clayton
has said anything to change the law on equating "unlawful" with "arbitrary"
and on the definitions of "arbitrary" and "detention". The answers to those
specific questions are "possibly", "no", and "no". The more important
general question is whether Clayton has changed anything with regard
to the claim that we really have no section 9 jurisprudence. The answer
there is that post-Clayton we still have no section 9 jurisprudence, but
that statement is now true in a new and unfortunate fashion.
R. v. Clayton*6 concerned two accused stopped at a police roadblock
set up in response to a report of men with guns in a parking lot, and
describing particular vehicles. The police stopped all vehicles leaving
the parking lot whether they matched the vehicle descriptions or not:
Clayton and Farmer, the occupants of one car, were both found to have
handguns. A central issue was whether there was a violation of the
accuseds' section 9 rights.
There was no dispute that the two accused were detained, and so the
decision offers nothing new on that point. There is also no discussion of
the definition of "arbitrary", except to the extent that that issue is related
to the question of equating "unlawful" and "arbitrary". That particular
equation, as noted above, is one which the Court has neither rejected nor
accepted in previous case law. In R. v. Clayton, however, in a throwaway
line offered as though the point had been long settled, the Court states:
83
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If the police conduct in detaining and searching Clayton and Farmer
amounted to a lawful exercise of their common law powers, there was
no violation of their Charter rights. If, on the other hand, the conduct
fell outside the scope of these powers, it represented an infringement
of the right under the Charter not to be arbitrarily detained or subjected
to an unreasonable search or seizure, (emphasis added).87

In this passage the Court does not merely repeat the long-established
point that a lawful detention is not arbitrary. It also adopts the
complementary point that an unlawful detention is arbitrary. Thus, the
Court here explicitly articulates both halves of the "unlawful = arbitrary"
equation. Indeed, it has done this by coupling the analytical framework
for section 9 to that of section 8.
That is precisely the approach which I have argued the Court ought
to have taken before, and so of course it is encouraging to see it adopted.
The way in which it has been done is very casual, however, and the
point is not actually essential to the result reached in the case, so it will
be important to see the point picked up and applied in subsequent cases.
In fact, the Court has actually done more than just equate "unlawful"
and "arbitrary": it also explicitly articulates the principle that for a lawful
detention the law itself must be reasonable. It held:
The statement that a detention which is lawful is not arbitrary should
not be understood as exempting the authorizing law, whether it is
common law or statutory, from Charter scrutiny. Previous decisions of
this Court are clear that where a detention by police is authorized by law,
the law authorizing detention is also subject to Charter scrutiny ...88

Once again this adopts the approach to section 9 which I have
suggested should be adopted. This particular point, however, raises the
way in which R. v. Clayton in fact undermines the notion of a section 9
jurisprudence. While saying the right thing on this point, the majority does
the wrong thing, and adopts an approach which turns Charter analysis
on its head.
The objection I wish to make to the majority's approach in R. v.
Clayton*9 is very similar to that made by the minority decision in the
case: in essence, that the analysis of the Charter issue is not a Charter
analysis at all. The effect is therefore to leave us still without a section 9
jurisprudence, because the issues have been taken out of the Charter
87
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realm. I will briefly review the minority and majority's approaches to the
case, but then turn to relate the majority's approach more specifically to
past section 9 cases, to show how dramatically matters have changed.
As noted, R. v. Clayton90 concerned whether in stopping the accused
at the roadblock despite the fact that their vehicle did not match any
description given, the police violated section 9. The minority judges held
that the proper method of analysis was first to ask whether the police
acted lawfully in stopping the accused: in particular, whether there was
a common law power permitting them to do so. The second question
was whether that common law power resulted in an arbitrary detention.
If so, the next step was to ask whether that law was justified under
section 1. The minority judges also noted that in some cases it would be
necessary to ask whether the power was exercised reasonably in the totality
of the circumstances. All of this is entirely in accord with the traditional
approach to Charter analysis, in some cases (for example the fourth step)
bringing the approach to section 9 more in line with that taken to other
sections.
Applying that approach to the case, the dissent concluded that no
previously existing common law power (such as those in R. v. Dedman^
or R. v. Mann92) authorized the stop but that (using the Waterfield test93)
a new common law power to set up a roadblock of all vehicles in response
to a report of ongoing serious firearm offences should be created. As a
result the detention was authorized by law. That law would nonetheless
create an arbitrary detention, since it would permit stops in the absence
of individualized suspicion. However, that section 9 violation could be
saved under section 1, and so the law did not ultimately violate the
Charter. Since the manner in which the legal power was used in the case
was reasonable, there was no Charter violation.
The majority, really, do none of these things. As noted, they state
the rule that laws authorizing detentions are subject to Charter scrutiny.
However, on the basis that the common law should be developed in a
manner consistent with the Charter, they immediately replace the question
of whether the accuseds' section 9 rights were violated with the question of
whether the Waterfield test authorized the actions of the police. That is,
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the analysis ceases to be one about individual rights and becomes one
about police powers.
Thus, the majority approach does explicitly recognize a point which
has been implicit in much previous section 9 case law: that the law must
be reasonable. Having recognized the point, though, the majority turns
the reasonableness of the law purely into a question about the ancillary
powers doctrine. This is the contrary of a section 9 Charter jurisprudence.
The point of section 9 is to protect individuals from unreasonable
interference by the state, and particularly to protect against the expansion
of state power. In contrast, the point of the Waterfieltf4 test is exactly to
expand state power. Thus the majority's approach has the opposite goal
to that which a section 9 analysis should have. Where the question should
be "what protection do individuals need from state power?" the majority
instead asks "what powers does the state need?" One can hardly call this
approach a section 9 jurisprudence.
Indeed, the decision has the effect of expanding police powers
dramatically. The Waterfiel(f' test depends on two criteria: that the police
were acting in the general course of their duties, and that the actions they
took were not an unjustifiable use of powers associated with the duty.
The first criterion is rarely in issue, and so it is the second which really
settles the issue. In R. v. Clayton the majority effectively reduce that
question to whether in the totality of the circumstances "the detention of
a particular individual is 'reasonably necessary'".96 But to say that the
police can detain an individual whenever that is reasonably necessary is
to make that ability far more frequently available to police.
One might suggest that the majority's approach is still doing the same
thing as section 9 intends: both approaches are meant to find the proper
balance between individual rights and the needs of the state. However,
there is a very real difference depending on what one regards as the norm
and what is carved out from the norm. Recall that R. v. Mann restated
the fundamental principle that "the police ... may act only to the extent
that they are empowered to do so by law."97 That amounts to saying that
the norm is for the police to be unable to interfere with individual liberty,
no matter how reasonable it might be to do so, unless they have been
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given a specific power. The approach in R. v. Clayton,9* on the other hand,
amounts to saying that the police have the power to do anything which
is reasonable. In that event, the norm is that police are empowered to act,
with an exception for cases where that can be shown to be unreasonable.
That approach might pay lip service to the fundamental principle of
limited police power, but contradicts its spirit.
There is another way to look at this point, which ties it more closely
to previous section 9 case law. In R. v. Dedman," the Court below had
drawn a distinction between police powers and legal liberties. In signalling
the accused to pull over for a vehicle stop the officer was not, the Court
of Appeal had held, exercising a power. However, there was no criminal
or tort law preventing the officer from signalling the accused to stop,
and so he had the legal liberty to do so. In the circumstances that had
been held sufficient. The Supreme Court rejected this view. They held
that reliance on a legal liberty was not an appropriate approach. Rather,
"[pjolice officers ... only act lawfully if they act in the exercise of authority
which is either conferred by statute or derived as a matter of common
law from their duties."100
On the one hand, the majority's approach is consistent with the letter
of this principle, since on the approach in R. v. Clayton101 the police
become authorized at common law to detain. However, the approach is
inconsistent with the spirit of R. v. Dedman.102 To say that police are
authorized at common law to detain when that is reasonably necessary is
virtually to say that they can detain so long as no law prevents them from
doing so: most exercises of legal liberties will be reasonable. In its effect
Clayton therefore comes very close to saying that as long as police act
in accordance with their legal liberties then they are empowered to act:
that is inconsistent with Dedman. Essentially every reasonable detention
is a police power on the Clayton approach.
Further, adopting this point goes some considerable distance toward
undermining having equated "unlawful" with "arbitrary" earlier in the
decision. A major benefit of making that equation is to simplify the task
of deciding whether or not a detention is arbitrary, since it should be
relatively simple to determine whether it was made unlawfully. But on
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the R. v. Clayton103 approach it will become more difficult to determine
whether a detention was unlawful. The absence of a statutory power will
certainly not settle the point, because if the detention is found to be
reasonable then it will likely turn out to have been lawful after all. However
it will not always be obvious beforehand — and certainly not at the time
of the interaction between the police and the individual — whether the
detention will later be seen as reasonable. In that event, the scope of
section 9 is actually made less clear, not more clear, by the decision.
Similarly, it was argued above that a benefit of equating "unlawful"
and "arbitrary" was that it better reflected the fundamental principle,
found in R. v. Mannm and elsewhere, that individuals are free to do
anything not forbidden while police are only permitted to do those things
they are specifically empowered to do. That is, there will be some situations
where an individual clearly has a Charter right not to be arbitrarily detained,
and other situations where police clearly have the power to detain an
individual. Falling in between those clear situations will be a large grey
area, where an individual's behaviour will simply fall into the "not
forbidden" category, rather than being the exercise of a guaranteed right.
In those cases it will be less clear whether police action which is not
specifically authorized by law will constitute an arbitrary detention. To
say that unlawful — i.e., not in accordance with a specific power granted
to the police — actions are arbitrary is to start the analysis on the
assumption that there is a prima facie section 9 violation. This would
then allow the grey area to be dealt with by balancing the various relevant
factors, which will be relevant to later parts of the Charter analysis such
as in section 1 or section 24.
On the other hand, the approach in R. v. Clayton^ of asking what
powers police need rather than what freedoms individuals need leads to
the opposite result. On the reasoning in Clayton, actions will be lawful if
they are permitted at common law, and the common law powers of the
police will include actions which are reasonably necessary. In effect this
eliminates most of the grey area, assimilating it into the police powers
category. Accordingly, there would be no prima facie Charter violation
and therefore no opportunity to balance the relevant factors at later stages
of the analysis.
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To conclude on R v. Clayton,1011 two things are worth noting. The first
is a certain irony. Neither R. v. Dedmanm nor R. v. Mannm were hailed
as strong "civil liberty" cases when they were handed down: rather, both
were expansions of police powers. That one can criticize Clayton for
failing to live up to the standards of restraint on state power articulated
in those decisions, therefore, is a truly worrying prospect.
The other concluding point relates to a matter which is taken for
granted by the majority and explicitly stated by the minority, but which,
it must be said, is not correct. The whole discussion around the legality
of the police action focuses on whether there is a common law power in
this case, because the "absence of Parliamentary action"109 makes that
approach necessary. In fact, though, Parliament has legislated in ways
directly relevant to this situation.
A police roadblock is an investigative procedure which constitutes a
search, and an unreasonable one if not authorized. No provision in the
Criminal Code"0 specifically authorizes roadblocks — which means
that the police here could have obtained a general warrant under section
487.01 authorizing them to act as they did. Further, under section 487.01(7)
they could have obtained that general warrant by telephone, using the
telewarrant provisions. Parliament in fact has acted in a way to cover
precisely this situation, and indeed virtually all situations, since section
487.01 allows a warrant to "do any thing".
The police might claim that there was not time in this situation even
to obtain a telewarrant, since immediate action was necessary. In that
regard it is worth noting Parliament's action in creating section 487.11
of the Criminal Code,"[ allowing some powers to be exercised in exigent
circumstances where grounds for a warrant exist but it is impracticable
to obtain one. Note, though, that although Parliament made that provision
available for search warrants in section 487, it did not make them available
for general warrants in section 487.01. On the other hand, this "exigent
circumstances" exception, which was added to the Code after the general
warrant provisions, does apply to section 492.1 tracking warrants, which
were added to the Code at the same time as general warrants. It seems
hard to escape the conclusion that Parliament deliberately did not make
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the powers available under general warrants available without judicial
scrutiny in exigent circumstances. That deliberate decision is not an
"absence of Parliamentary action": it is a conscious policy choice. Further,
it is a conscious policy choice ignored and contradicted by creating a
common law power to exactly the opposite effect.
Of course, one might analyze sections 487.01, 487.1, 487.11 and
others and reach a different conclusion than that offered here. But surely
if a new common law power is to be created on the basis of Parliamentary
inaction, a full justification must look at the variety of relevant ways
Parliament has in fact acted.

IV. CONCLUSION
The right not to be arbitrarily detained has been the neglected aspect
of the legal rights set out in the Charter. There is no reason in principle
that this should be so: the nature of many coercive state powers is precisely
to detain, and therefore knowing the limits on such powers would be a
valuable thing. Nonetheless, the first 25 years of Charter case law failed
to establish a useful method of analysis for assessing section 9 claims.
Such a long period of neglect seems undesirable, and of course it is
so. The most recent developments, however, suggest that benign neglect
can be preferable to harmful attention. To neglect section 9 was simply
not to develop the limits on state power that could have been developed.
To continue in the approach to section 9 that R. v. Clayton"2 adopts,
however, would actually be to expand state power.
It is worth recalling the words of Dickson J. (as he then was) speaking
for a unanimous Supreme Court in the early days of Charter jurisprudence:
I begin with the obvious. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
is a purposive document. Its purpose is to guarantee and to protect,
within the limits of reason, the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it
enshrines. It is intended to constrain governmental action inconsistent
with those rights and freedoms; it is not in itself an authorization for
governmental action.10
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Failing to have a well-articulated approach to deciding whether or
not the detention of an individual was arbitrary is unfortunate. On balance,
however, that was preferable to an approach that turns the Charter on its
head and makes it a tool for the limitation, not the protection, of individual
rights.

